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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The names of the parties are set forth in the caption of this 
brief. Defendant J.R. Simplot is not a party to the appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
Defendant Savage Scaffold & Equipment ("Savage") was granted 
summary judgment on May 25, 1994. The court's order was certified 
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54(b) as final and appealable. R. 178-179. 
Plaintiff appeals pursuant to U.R.A.P. 3. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court correctly grant summary judgment 
where Plaintiff failed to show any evidence that the contract 
between Plaintiff and Defendant was adhesive in nature or that it 
was unconscionable and the plain terms required Plaintiff to 
indemnify Defendant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous they 
may be ruled on as a matter of law by the court. Colonial Leasing 
v. Larsen Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). Upon review 
of a granting of a motion for summary judgment, the reviewing court 
applies the same standard as applied by the trial court. Briggs v. 
Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Bruce Boyd, a painting contractor, approached 
Defendant Savage Scaffold & Equipment to rent scaffolding 
equipment. In connection with the rental, Plaintiff executed a 
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rental agreement with Defendant. One of the provisions of the 
agreement required Boyd to indemnify and defend Savage against all 
claims asserted against Defendant arising out of the use of the 
equipment, including Defendant's own negligence. 
Plaintiff and a co-worker were later injured when a catwalk on 
top of the building was improperly used by the Plaintiff as an 
anchor for the scaffolding and failed. Plaintiff sued Defendant in 
state court. The injured co-worker sued Defendant in a similar 
action in Federal District Court for the District of Utah. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Savage brought its motion for summary judgment 
seeking to have the indemnity provision of the rental agreement 
enforced, requiring Plaintiff Boyd to defend and indemnify 
Defendant in this action as well as the federal court action. 
The Plaintiff acknowledged that he had rented scaffolding from 
Defendant on numerous occasions, that he had executed the document 
and had initialed that he had read the entire document. Further, 
Plaintiff admitted at oral argument that the terms of the document 
were clear and unambiguous. However, Plaintiff argued that because 
the contract contained hidden provisions it was adhesive and was 
not enforceable against Plaintiff because he did not intend to be 
bound by an indemnity agreement. 
2 
The trial court requested additional briefing on the 
requirements for establishing a contract of adhesion in Utah and 
what the effect of showing an adhesion contract establishes. After 
supplemental briefing by both parties, the court ruled that 
Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case that the 
contract was one of adhesion. The court then examined the 
agreement and, coupled with Plaintiff's acknowledgment that the 
terms were clear and unambiguous, held that, as a matter of law, 
the contract's indemnity provision was enforceable. The court 
ordered Plaintiff to indemnify Defendant in the state court and 
federal court actions pursuant to the plain terms of the agreement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The material undisputed facts set forth by Defendant 
Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. to the trial court below were as 
follows: 
1. On May 17, 1991 Bruce Boyd dba Bruce's 
Industrial Painting Co. (hereinafter BIPCO) entered into 
a rental agreement with Savage Scaffold & Equipment Co. 
for certain scaffolding equipment. (See Rental 
Agreement.) 
R. 109. 
2. On July 5, 1991 Boyd alleges that while he was 
engaged in his employment as a painter, the scaffolding 
failed and he fell approximately 60 feet to the ground. 
(Boyd Complaint at 5.) 
3. Boyd alleges further that the accident resulted 
from a breach by Savage of its duty to adequately direct, 
instruct, and warn Boyd with respect to the dangers 
3 
inherent in, and with respect to, the proper method for 
the use of the equipment. (Boyd Complaint at 7). 
4. Robert J. Kane and Beverly Kane allege the same 
in a suit by them, against Savage, filed in Utah's 
Federal District Court. (Kane Amended Complaint at 8-9.) 
5. Paragraph 15 of the Rental Agreement of May 17, 
1991 provides that the lessee will defend and indemnify 
the lessor. (See Rental Agreement.) 
R. 109. 
6. Boyd received the indemnity agreement, signed 
it and additionally initialled it acknowledging that he 
read and agreed to the indemnity provision of paragraph 
15. (See Rental Agreement; Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc.'s Request for 
Admissions at 2.) 
7. Boyd admits that he has rented equipment from 
Savage approximately 15 times. (See Plaintiff's Response 
to Defendant Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc.'s Request 
for Admissions at 1; Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's 
Interrogatories at 11.) 
8. Boyd admits that he received a copy of the 
Rental Agreement following his execution and initialling 
of the document. (See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant 
Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc.'s Request for 
Admissions.) 
9. Boyd has received notice of the intent on the 
part of Savage to enforce the indemnification provision. 
(See Tender of Defense letter mailed February 17, 1993; 
January 13, 1993 letter to Dan Gibbons, counsel for Mr. 
Boyd.) 
R. 65-67. 
2. In opposition to Defendant's statement of undisputed 
material facts, Plaintiff asserted the following as disputed issues 
of fact: 
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1. Paragraph 6 of the defendant's statement of 
facts is incorrect. The initialing on the front of the 
Defendant's form rental agreement does not indicate that 
the plaintiff read and agreed to the indemnity provision 
of paragraph 15. The initialing is in regard to 
paragraph 16. (See Rental Agreement.) 
2. The Rental Agreement is a form contract 
prepared by Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Savage") without input from 
or negotiation with the individuals to whom they rent 
equipment. 
3. The plaintiff never had a discussion with any 
individual at Savage with regard to the terms of the 
indemnity provision found on two of the back sheets of 
the four page contract. (See Boyd's affidavit, 
paragraphs 9 and 11.) 
4. The indemnity provision is not clearly 
presented to the renter of the equipment in that it is 
hidden on back sheets inside the four page document. (An 
exemplar of the contract will be brought for the court's 
review at the time of the oral argument. The defendant 
has refused to provide additional exemplars to the 
plaintiff.) 
R. 86-87. 
3. The Rental Agreement provides on the first page a 
separate paragraph set off in capital letters which provides as 
follows: 
I HAVE READ THE TERMS ON THIS AND THE REVERSE SIDE AND 
AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE SAME. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT 
BELOW BY LESSEE'S EMPLOYEE, AGENT, TEAMSTER OR OTHER 
AUTHORIZED PERSON SHALL CONCLUSIVELY CONSTITUTE LESSEE'S 
AGREEMENT TO THIS LEASE (SEE PARAGRAPH 20). 
Plaintiff initialled the document immediately below this statement. 
R. 78. 
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4. The Rental Agreement also provides on the front page in 
capital letters and in contrasting red type, surrounded by a box: 
LESSEE WILL DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY LESSOR (PARAGRAPH 15). 
R. 109. 
5. Paragraph 15 of the Rental Agreement provides: 
15. INDEMNIFICATION: LESSEE SHALL INDEMNIFY AND DEFEND LESSOR 
AGAINST AND HOLD LESSOR HARMLESS FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS, 
ACTIONS, SUITS PROCEEDINGS, COSTS, EXPENSES, DAMAGES AND 
LIABILITIES, INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES WHICH: 
(1) RELATE TO INJURY OR TO DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, OR 
BODILY INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DISEASE OR DEATH OF ANY 
PERSON (INCLUDING EMPLOYEES OF LESSEE), AND 
(2) ARE CAUSED, OR CLAIMED TO BE CAUSED, IN WHOLE OR IN 
PART BY THE EQUIPMENT LEASED HEREIN OR BY THE LIABILITY 
OR CONDUCT (INCLUDING ACTIVE, PASSIVE, PRIMARY OR 
SECONDARY) OF LESSOR, ITS AGENTS OR EMPLOYEES OR ANYONE 
FOR WHOSE ACTS ANY OF THEM MAY BE LIABLE. THE PARTIES 
AGREE THAT LESSOR SHALL ONLY BE LIABLE OR RESPONSIBLE FOR 
ACTIONS OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT. 
LESSEE SHALL, AT ITS OWN COST AND EXPENSE, DEFEND 
LESSOR AGAINST ALL SUITS OR PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED BY 
ANYONE IN WHICH LESSOR IS A NAMED PARTY FOR WHICH LESSOR 
IS ALLEGED TO BE LIABLE OR RESPONSIBLE AS A RESULT OF OR 
ALLEGING OUT OF THE EQUIPMENT, OR ANY ALLEGED ACT OR 
OMISSION BY LESSOR, AND LESSEE SHALL BE LIABLE AND 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL COSTS, EXPENSES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INCURRED IN SUCH DEFENSE AND OR SETTLEMENT, JUDGMENT OR 
OTHER RESOLUTION. IN THE EVENT THAT SUCH AN ACTION IS 
COMMENCED NAMING LESSOR AS A PARTY LESSOR MAY ELECT TO 
DEFEND SAID ACTION ON ITS OWN BEHALF AND LESSEE AGREES 
THAT IT SHALL BE LIABLE FOR ALL COSTS, EXPENSES AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED BY LESSOR IN SUCH DEFENSE. 
PURPOSE OF THIS CLAUSE: IT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS CLAUSE TO 
SHIFT THE RISK OF ALL CLAIMS RELATING TO THE LEASED PROPERTY 
TO THE LESSEE DURING THE ENTIRE TERM OF THIS LEASE. 
R. 109A. 
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6. Plaintiff also admits receiving a copy of the Agreement 
from the Defendant at the time he rented the equipment. R. 83A. 
7. The court was provided an exemplar copy of the rental 
agreement. R. 109-112A. 
8. At the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
to Enforce the Terms of the Indemnity Agreement, the court 
questioned Plaintiff's counsel on whether the Plaintiff claimed 
that the terms of the contract itself were ambiguous or unclear. 
Plaintiff's counsel responded negatively as follows: 
The Court: What's ambiguous about that agreement? 
Mr. Dunn: We are not looking to the ambiguity. We are 
going to the step before that, the language 
itself. We do not maintain it's ambiguous. 
The idea of this being an adhesion contract — 
well, basically there's a hidden trap in this 
type of agreement and that isf there can be no 
intention found in the facts and circumstances 
of Mr. Boyd signing it. The mere fact that he 
has entered — 
The Court: Is it fair to say that is the entirety of your 
challenge to this agreement, and that is, that 
it's a contract of adhesion? 
Mr. Dunn: That's correct, your Honor. 
R. 196-197. 
9. At the hearing on Defendant's Motion, the court requested 
the parties to brief the law in Utah regarding contracts of 
adhesion, and the judicial presumptions and burdens associated with 
adhesion contracts. The court stated: 
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The Court: What I'm going to do is ask each of you to 
submit memorandums on the same date so that we 
don't have crossfire. There is case law, not 
on the issue of contracts of adhesion in the 
context of indemnity contracts, maybe, but 
case law generally on what it takes to 
overcome motions for summary judgment when the 
claim is made generally that there is a 
contract of adhesion. 
And that's what I would like you to analysis 
for me. Because that's all that's in issue 
that Mr. Dunn has conceded that is his claim 
here. And I think I need that, and I don't 
think I have it now. 
R. 203. 
In effect, the only issue before the court was whether 
Plaintiff had produced disputed material facts on whether the 
contract was one of adhesion and what the effect of an adhesion 
contract is on enforceability of the indemnity provision. 
10. After supplemental briefing on the issue, the district 
court, by minute entry, ruled: 
Defendant Savage has moved for Summary Judgment on its 
indemnity contract with plaintiff. There is no evidence that 
the scaffolding was leased on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or 
that plaintiff occupied a disadvantageous bargaining position. 
As a consequence, there is no evidence to support a legal 
conclusion that the contract or the provision in question are 
contracts of adhesion. See, System Concepts. Inc., v. Dixon. 
669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). 
See Appendix, Minute Entry. 
11. In its order, the court specifically held that Plaintiff 
had failed to present admissible material evidence of adhesion, or 
that the contract was one of unconscionable terms and, therefore, 
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the contract could not be voided, but would be enforced as written. 
R. 152. 
12. Judge Murphy then ordered that the indemnity agreement 
was to be enforced according to its terms as a matter of law, and 
granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 152. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff failed to raise evidence of a prima facie case of 
unenforceable adhesion contract. In Utah, a contract will be 
considered adhesive where the plaintiff shows a form contract is 
offered to a party in a disadvantageous bargaining position on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
In this case, Plaintiff established only that the contract was 
a form contract prepared by the Defendant. However, Plaintiff 
failed to forward any evidence that he occupied a disadvantageous 
bargaining position or that the contract was offered to him on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
Plaintiff further admitted in oral argument that the terms of 
the contract were clear and unambiguous. As a result, even if the 
agreement is otherwise adhesive, it is subject only to scrutiny of 
the terms, with ambiguity resolved in favor of the Plaintiff. It 
does not itself render the agreement voidable. 
Finally, Plaintiff failed to forward evidence that the 
contract was procedurally or substantively unconscionable. At the 
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outset, Plaintiff's failure to establish disparate bargaining power 
is fatal to a claim of adhesion contract or unconscionability. 
Further, the risk shifting of indemnity agreements is acceptable as 
a matter of public policy and there is no evidence of onerous or 
deceptive business practice to support a claim of 
unconscionability. Plaintiff's failure to forward probative 
evidence of adhesion or unconscionability made the court's 
determination that Defendant is entitled to indemnification proper 
as a matter of law. The district court's judgment should be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RAISE A ^ GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
THAT THE CONTRACT WAS A CONTRACT OF ADHESION. 
A. Prima Facie Elements Of A Contract Of Adhesion 
The Utah Supreme Court in System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon. 669 
P.2d 421 (Utah 1983), listed three elements which must be present 
for a contract to be considered an adhesion contract under Utah 
law. The Court stated, "A contract is usually considered adhesive 
which is prepared in a standardized form and presented on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis to one occupying a disadvantageous bargaining 
position." Id. at 429. 
Thus, Plaintiff's burden below was to forward material facts 
showing that the contract (1) was prepared on a standardized form, 
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(2) was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and (3) that he 
occupied a disadvantageous bargaining position. System Concepts, 
at 429. His failure to make a showing of any one of the elements 
defeats his claim that the contract is one of adhesion. 
As will be shown below, the district court was not presented 
with any disputed material facts indicating that the contract was 
adhesive according to Utah law. The court, therefore, properly 
concluded that the contract was not a contract of adhesion as a 
matter of law and that it was enforceable according to its terms. 
B. Plaintiff Failed To Bring Forward Evidence To Establish 
That The Indemnity Agreement Is An Adhesion Contract. 
In this case, Plaintiff failed to bring to the district court 
genuine issues of material fact with respect to at least two 
elements of a prima facie case of adhesion. While Plaintiff did 
allege that the contract was a form contract, that fact alone is 
insufficient to establish the contract's adhesive nature.1 More 
importantly, for purposes of this appeal, there was no claim or 
evidence below that the contract was presented on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis to the Plaintiff, or, most significantly, that the 
Plaintiff occupied a disadvantageous bargaining position. 
Plaintiff's statement of disputed issues of fact and his Affidavit 
1
 "That the terms of a contract are embodied in a written 
form developed by one of the parties does not render it either a 
contract of adhesion or unenforceable." Resource Management Co. v. 
Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1048 (Utah 1985). 
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in Opposition to Summary Judgment fail to assert evidence of either 
factor. See, R. 86-87. 
Plaintiff merely brought evidence that the contract was a form 
contract prepared by Savage. See, supra. Statement of Facts 2 (2); 
see, also, R. 87. While this asserted fact may have satisfied the 
first factor of his claim, Plaintiff's complete failure of evidence 
of the other two factors properly mandated judgment in favor of 
Defendant. 
1. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE OCCUPIED AN UNEQUAL 
BARGAINING POSITION. 
In Utah, evidence of an unequal bargaining position is an 
essential element of a claim of adhesion contract. See System 
Concepts, at 492. For example, in System Concepts, the defendant, 
Dixon, was presented an employment agreement by her employer and 
was told that her continued employment was conditioned upon signing 
the contract. She signed the contract and later sought to void it 
because of its allegedly adhesive nature. The court rejected her 
claim stating that despite the employer-employee relationship and 
the fact that the employer made signing the contract mandatory, she 
failed to show disparate bargaining position between the parties. 
Id. at 429. 
In stark contrast to the claims in System Concepts, Plaintiff 
here does not occupy a special relationship with Defendant and the 
execution of the contract was not a condition of continued business 
12 
dealings. Instead, Plaintiff was a completely independent 
commercial contractor who was free to accept or reject any proposal 
or contract placed in front of him. See, supra. Statement of Facts 
no. 1, Statement of Undisputed Facts no. 1; R. 65. 
Further, Plaintiff has completely failed to assert or show any 
facts which would place him under duress or in a situation that 
would leave him no choice but to enter into the agreement according 
to whatever terms were dictated by Defendant. See, supra, 
Statement of Facts no. 2; R. 66. Instead, he merely claims that 
there was no discussion of the contracts terms. See, supra, 
Statement of Facts no. 2 (3); R. 87. Because Plaintiff failed to 
show disparate bargaining position existed, he failed to show an 
adhesion contract as a matter of law. The district court was 
correct in granting Defendant Savage summary judgment. 
2. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS FORCED TO 
ENTER THE CONTRACT ON A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT BASIS. 
Utah law also requires a party seeking to void a contract on 
grounds of its adhesive nature to show that the contract was 
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. System Concepts, at 429. 
This factor, by its nature, implies that the party offering the 
contract refuses to modify or amend terms considered by the other 
party to be onerous. Consequently, the other party has no real 
choice but to accept or forego the service or contract altogether. 
Id. 
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The fact that no negotiation takes place does not render a 
contract a take-it-or-leave-it deal. After all, many parties will 
make a proposed deal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. That, in and 
of itself, does not render the bargain void. The danger of 
adhesion contracts arises where the party dictating the terms is 
the only source of the product or service and there is a danger 
that even onerous or unfair terms would be accepted by a consumer 
in order to obtain the product or service. See, Resource 
Management v. Weston Ranch. 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah 1985). 
In response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff did not present 
any disputed fact whereby it could be inferred that he was 
presented with onerous terms and was forced to take the terms as 
presented or be unable to obtain scaffolding equipment. 
Plaintiffs Opposition and Affidavit merely state that no 
bargaining took place. See. R. 92-94; R. 86-87. This is a far cry 
from stating that Defendant refused to bargain when Plaintiff 
proposed different terms. Cf. Resource Management, at 1042-46. 
The undisputed facts do show, however, that Plaintiff, as a 
commercial painting contractor, was in an equal position to demand 
different terms as a condition of patronizing the Defendant with 
his business. See, supra. Statement of Facts, 1; R. 63. The 
parties occupied relatively equal positions in the commercial 
setting in which they operated. The Plaintiff presents no evidence 
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that he attempted to negotiate terms or, more importantly, that 
Defendant refused to negotiate with him over terms. As a 
consequence, no finding that the contract was offered on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis could be made by the court. See, R. 86-87; R. 
92-94. 
Because Plaintiff failed to raise issues of material fact 
showing that the contract at issue was an adhesion contract based 
on his failure to show a take-it-or-leave-it arrangement, the court 
properly granted summary judgment to Defendant as a matter of law. 
C. Even If The Contract Is Adhesive, That Alone Does Not 
Render The Agreement Void Or Voidable Because Plaintiff 
Failed To Assert Or Show Ambiguity In The Terms. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions on appeal and in the court 
below, a mere showing that the contract is adhesive in nature does 
not, alone, constitute grounds for its voidance. The Utah Supreme 
Court's analysis of insurance contracts is instructive in this area 
because, according to the Court, insurance policies are a "classic 
example of an adhesion contract." U.S.F.&G. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 
(Utah 1993). Utah courts do not simply rewrite or excuse 
performance of an insurance contract based on the mere fact that a 
policy is an adhesion contract. Instead, the courts apply a 
different scrutiny to the terms of the contract in light of the 
relationship of the parties. 
15 
For example, in the recent case of Allen v. Prudential 
Property and Cas. Co,. 839 P.2d 798, 803 (Utah 1992), the court 
stated, "the fact that an insurance contract is adhesive is no 
reason, in itself, to enforce what might be found to be the 
reasonable expectations of the insured when those expectations 
conflict with the plain terms of the policy," The Allen. court 
specifically declined the invitation to rewrite the clear and 
unambiguous provisions of an insurance contract even though it was 
an adhesion contract and the plaintiff argued lack of intent to be 
bound by the limitations set forth in the policy. Allen. at 804. 
Instead, the Allen, court upheld the practice of applying a 
stricter scrutiny in enforcing the terms of adhesive agreements, 
resolving ambiguity and inconsistency in favor of the party 
occupying the inferior bargaining position. See, id. at 805-806. 
At the hearing on summary judgment in this matter, Plaintiff 
acknowledged that the terms of the contract were clear and 
unambiguous. R. 196. Therefore, even assuming that the contract 
was adhesive, Plaintiff has failed to show that its terms are 
ambiguous or unenforceable even under the strictest judicial 
construction. Cf. Pickover v. Smiths Management Corp., 771 P.2d 
664, 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Plaintiff's claim that he should 
not be bound by the contract because he never intended to enter 
into an indemnity agreement is not a sufficient basis for having 
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the plain terms rewritten or performance excused. Cf., Allen. at 
806. Plaintiff's arguments excusing performance based on his lack 
of intent must fail. 
Plaintiff's admission that the terms are clear and unambiguous 
is fatal to his claim of voidance. Merely showing that the 
contract was adhesive does not render the indemnity provision 
voidable by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff failed to show that the 
contract was adhesive. That fact, coupled with his failure to show 
that the terms of the agreement were ambiguous, makes the district 
court's judgment proper as a matter of law. Summary judgment 
should be affirmed. 
D. Where Plaintiff Fails To Show Disparate Bargaining 
Position, The Claim Of Adhesion Or Unconscionability Is 
Simply Inapplicable. 
According to Utah law, where bargaining power is equal and 
does not invoke flagrantly unjust provisions or agreements, "the 
doctrines regarding contracts of adhesion and unconscionability are 
inapplicable." White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1983). In 
this case, it has been shown that Plaintiff failed to show any 
evidence that the parties occupied unequal bargaining positions. 
The undisputed facts in the record below indicate that both parties 
were experienced businesses operating in a commercial setting. 
Plaintiff admits, for example, that over the period of his 
relationship with defendant he rented scaffolding on approximately 
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fifteen occasions. See, R. 83. Cf^ _, White, at 1300 (plaintiff 
dealt with defendant in commercial setting on numerous occasions). 
As a result, this Court does not need to address Plaintiff's 
additional arguments regarding unconscionability of the terms of 
the contract. See, White, at 1300. 
This Court may be satisfied that risk allocation among 
commercial businesses is recognized and acceptable in this state. 
CjU Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). The 
Plaintiff's cries of unfairness of the indemnity agreement do not 
rise to a level that demonstrates the provisions are flagrantly 
unjust or are contrary to established public policy. See, infra, 
II A. This is especially true in light of the fact that Plaintiff 
admitted that the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous. 
Cf., Freund, at 370. Therefore, the trial court was correct in 
determining that the contracts terms are enforceable as written 
and Defendant is entitled to indemnity as a matter of law. 
II 
THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT IS NOT PROCEDURALLY OR SUBSTANTIVELY 
UNCONSCIONABLE• 
For the first time on appeal, Plaintiff raises arguments 
regarding the unconscionability of the indemnity agreement under 
two theories; procedural and substantive unconscionability. For 
this reason, the Court need not address the theories as not being 
presented to the court below. However, even if the theories are 
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applicable, they do not have factual support in the record below 
and judgment was, nonetheless, properly granted by the district 
court. 
A. Substantive Unconscionability. 
Substantive unconscionability deals with the nature or basis 
of the agreement itself and whether it is contrary to accepted 
mores of commercial conduct or public policy. See, Resource 
Management, at 1041. The court in Resource Management, held, 
"although the right to contract freely on terms which establish and 
allocate risks between the contracting parties is fundamental, 
courts nonetheless recognize some limits to the extent to which a 
party may be compelled to perform an unconscionable duty." Id. at 
1040. Risk shifting is recognized to be a part of every bargain 
and the indemnity provisions in general are recognized as valid and 
enforceable under Utah law. Freund, at 370. As the court in 
Resource Management, stated, "virtually all contracts involve the 
assessment of risks." Resource Management, at 1043. 
Therefore, in examining substantive unconscionability, courts 
will look at the time of the execution of the contract to determine 
if the "contract was so unfair and oppressive in its mutual 
obligations as to shock the conscience." Id. at 1044. The 
appellate court will consider the contract unconscionable only if 
the "terms are ,so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to 
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the mores and business practices in place.'" Resource Management, 
at 1042, (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts §128, at 551 (1963))• 
Instead of presenting any evidence that the terms of the 
indemnity agreement itself are unacceptable or even frowned on in 
the scaffolding rental industry, Plaintiff merely asserts that, on 
its face, the document is contrary to public policy announced in 
the Liability Reform Act. See, Plaintiff's Brief, Argument II, pp. 
15-20. Therefore, Plaintiff implicitly concedes that the 
commercial mores of the industry accept and condone the practice of 
indemnity agreements. 
Plaintiff's public policy argument also fails as a matter of 
law because the Appellate Courts of this state have expressly held 
that indemnity contracts involving such legislatively detailed 
areas as workers' compensation are acceptable. See, Freund, at 
370. Risk allocation by contract is especially valid in a 
commercial setting. See, Freund, at 370; Gordon v. CRS Consulting 
Engineers Inc.. 820 P.2d 492, 493 (Utah App. 1991); Pickover, at 
666 (the court notes the current trend to relax the strict 
construction rule of indemnity agreements in commercial settings). 
In his Brief, Plaintiff merely states that the risk imposed by 
the contract is unfair in light of the Liability Reform Act. In 
making the assertion, Plaintiff ignores Utah law that recognizes 
express indemnity provisions despite legislative foreclosure of 
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common law indemnity after the passage of the Liability Reform Act. 
See, generally, Freund, at 370; Gordon, at 494. Plaintiffs claim 
of substantive unconscionability must fail. The district court 
properly granted judgment by applying the indemnity agreement 
according to its plain terms. 
B. Procedural Unconscionability. 
Plaintiff also asserts the circumstances of the rental 
agreement constitute procedural unconscionability, excusing 
performance of the contract. Plaintiff's entire focus on appeal is 
the lack of bargaining which took place over the terms of the 
contract and that Plaintiff never intended to indemnify Defendant. 
See, Plaintiff's Brief, Argument I, pp. 9-15. Howeverf in the 
court below, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment with any admissible evidence upon which this Court 
can state that the conduct of the parties left Plaintiff unable to 
anticipate the effect of the indemnity agreement or that the 
parties should not be bound by the agreement they signed. 
Plaintiff merely concludes the indemnity provision was hidden in 
the contract and unknown to Plaintiff. R. 87, Disputed Fact. no. 
4. 
The court in Resource Management, pointed to several factors 
that could be considered grounds for a claim of procedural 
unconscionability, none of which exist in this case. The first was 
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the relative bargaining power of the parties. See Resource 
Management, at 1047. This topic has been disposed of in the 
discussion of the bargaining powers in establishing a prima facie 
case of adhesion contracts. See, supra. Argument I, A. 1. 
Second, Resource Management, addresses and forecloses 
Plaintiff's claims that his failure to read or understand the 
contract's terms somehow excuses performance. Plaintiff would go 
so far as to impose upon the Defendant the duty to explain each 
clause of a contract to ensure the other party's understanding and 
assent. See, Plaintiff's Brief at 9-15. Plaintiff's cited 
authority from treatises and other jurisdictions is not supported 
by express Utah law on the subject of the relative duties of the 
parties and clear contract language. The Utah Supreme Court 
clearly stated in Resource Management, "one party to a contract 
does not have a duty to ensure that the other has a complete and 
accurate understanding of all the terms embodied in a written 
contract." Id. at 1047. Moreover, each party is obligated to read 
and understand a document upon which he places his signature. Id. 
He cannot complain latter that his ignorance or the fact that he 
didn't read the document excuses performance. See, Resource 
Management, at 1047-48. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's arguments, Defendant is under no 
obligation to point out each of the terms of the contract or make 
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sure that the Plaintiff is apprised of each provision and all of 
the potential consequences of his signing the contract. The 
parties are assumed to be capable of reading and understanding the 
document and it is incumbent upon each person signing a contract to 
be aware of what they are affixing their signature to and the 
effect it will have. Id. 
Plaintiff somehow attempts to argue that his own failure to 
assent to the contract or read or notice the indemnity provision 
somehow can serve to create a voidable condition. Plaintiff cannot 
claim of lack of assent when he asserts that he lacked intent 
based, in part, on his failure to read the document. See, Resource 
Management. at 1048. 
Next, the court in Resource Management, addressed whether or 
not the party had "meaningful choice" in entering the bargain. Id. 
at 1048. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument in that case, 
stating that the purchaser had the "trump card" because he was free 
to "assent to the deal, to negotiate modifications of its terms, or 
simply walk away." Id. at 1048. Plaintiff here was in a similar 
bargaining position. Plaintiff was the party approaching Defendant 
Savage with the money to rent equipment. Plaintiff, not Defendant, 
held the final word regarding whether or not he would rent from 
Defendant. Plaintiff's failure to advance evidence that he held no 
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meaningful choice but to rent under Defendant's terms defeats his 
claim of procedural unconscionability as a matter of law* 
Finally, procedural unconscionability may also be shown by the 
fact that the terms of the agreement are "hidden in a maze of fine 
print and minimized by deceptive sales practices." Id* at 1048. 
However, where the Plaintiff has admitted that the terms themselves 
are clear and unambiguous, he cannot justly complain that the 
provision was hidden from him. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot claim 
the term was hidden where he also admits he initialed that he had 
read the entire agreement. R. 83A. The court in Resource 
Management, stated: 
A person who, having the capacity and an opportunity to read 
a contract, is not misled as to its contents and who sustains 
no confidential relationship to the other party cannot void 
the contract on the ground of mistake if he signs it without 
reading it, at least in the absence of special circumstances 
excusing his failure to read it. If the contract is plain and 
unequivocal in its terms, he is ordinarily bound thereby. 
Id. at 1047. Plaintiff offers no evidence that the Plaintiff was 
unaware of the provision after reading the contract. He merely 
concludes that the language was hidden without any support in the 
record. See, supra. Statement of Facts, 2 (3) and (4); R. 87. 
It is undisputed that paragraph 15 of the agreement in this 
case was set forth on the back page in larger differentiated type. 
It is undisputed that on the front page, the text referring the 
reader to the indemnity provisions was set out in capital letters 
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of contrasting red type. Further, Plaintiff initialed the front 
page of the document, indicating that he had read and understood 
the agreement and all provisions contained on both the back and 
front pages of the contract. R. 78. As in Resource Management, 
"this is a far cry from those cases where fine print, complex 
terminology, and presentation of contract form on a take it or 
leave it basis constitute the basis for a finding of 
unconscionability." Id. at 1049. Plaintiff failed to forward any 
fact indicating that he read the contract but failed to notice the 
provision because of its size, location or emphasis. Nor did 
Plaintiff assert the terms of the contract were too complex to 
understand. Plaintiff asserts only that after suing Defendant he 
was surprised to find out that he had agreed to indemnify 
Defendant. Plaintiffs claim is not based on any disputed fact, 
and his intent, or lack thereof is irrelevant at this point. 
The trial court was entirely within the bounds of propriety to 
determine as a matter of law that the contract was plain and 
unambiguous. Plaintiff therefore failed to raise a genuine issue 
of fact that the contract was made in procedurally unconscionable 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
The court was correct in ruling that Plaintiff had failed to 
make out a prima facie case of adhesion contract in this matter. 
25 
Plaintiff failed to show any fact indicating that he occupied a 
disparate bargaining position. He also failed to show any evidence 
that the contract was made on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis. 
Further, by admitting that the document itself is plain and 
unambiguous, Plaintiff may not void the plain terms of the 
indemnity agreement even if it is otherwise found to be an adhesion 
contract. 
Finally, Plaintiff's failure to show that he occupied an 
unequal bargaining position is fatal to his claims of 
unconscionability and adhesion. Even if the doctrines of 
unconscionability and adhesion are applicable, Plaintiff failed to 
show any evidence that the contract was either procedurally or 
substantively unconscionable. 
Indemnity contracts are an acceptable means of risk allocation 
between parties in Utah, especially in a commercial setting. 
Further, Plaintiff failed to show any colorable evidence that the 
conduct of the parties or the contract itself were unfair or 
procured in an improper manner. 
The trial court was correct in finding that Plaintiff failed 
to raise evidence that the contract was one of adhesion. 
Therefore, Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
and to have the plain terms of the indemnity agreement enforced as 
written. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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day of January, 1995. 
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IK THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATB OF UTAH 
Bruce A. Boyd, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
J. R, Simplot Company, a 
Nevada corporation, and Savage 
Scaffold & Equipment, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO: 930902896 PI 
JUDGE MICHAEL R* MURPHY 
Defendant Savage has moved for Summary Judgment on its 
indemnity contract with plaintiff. There is no evidence that the 
scaffolding was leased on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or that 
plaintiff occupied a disadvantageous bargaining position. As a 
consequence, there is no evidence to support a legal conclusion 
that the contract or the provision in question are contracts of 
adhesion. See Sys tern Concents. Inc.. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 
1983). 
The indemnity provision in question is clear and unambiguous. 
It therefore overcomes any judicial antipathy to such indemnity 
provisions. 
BOYD V. SIMPLOT PAGE 1VN0 MINUTE ENTRY 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Savage's Motion for 
Sunmary Judgment is granted. 
DATED this P__ day of September, 1993. 
_ B 
Michael R. MuTphy 
District Court Judge 
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Deputy Clerk 
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HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE A. BOYD, i 
Plaintiff, J 
V • 4 
J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, a ; 
Nevada corporation, and : 
SAVAGE SCAFFOLD & EQUIPMENT, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
: Civil No. 93 0902896PI 
i Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant, Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. 's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on its indemnity claim, having come before the 
court for oral arguments on Monday, September 13, 1993, the court 
having heard oral arguments and, having reviewed the memoranda and 
having received supplemental memoranda on September 15, 1993; 
therefore, being fully advised in the premises 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that for the 
reasons contained in the Minute Entry Savage Scaffold & Equipment, 
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on the indemnity provision is 
granted, Bruce A. Boyd must indemnify Savage Scaffold & Equipment 
Inc. for his claims presented in this action and in the pending 
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action of Robert J. Kane. Jr. and Beverly Kane v. J.R. Simplot 
Company and Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc.. currently pending in 
the Federal District Court, Central Division, State of Utah, Civil 
No.: 92-C-234S. 
DATED this _ _ ^ _ 
BY THE COURT: 
Oct 
y day of September, 1993. 
APPROVEB-^AS T6-F0RM: 
MARK DALTON DUNN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
U.Jmi 
MICHAEL R. MURP 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
93-389.10 
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